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FRANCE GOES TO THE 
P O LLS . 77ii's article was written by  an Australian leftist u>ho has been living in Paris for  several years.
I
The present political situation in France 
could hardly be described as simple. A few 
months ago, however, it looked fairly cut and 
dried - at least up to a certain point. The 
Union of the Left looked certain to win the 
elections in March 1978. The left had just 
won the local elections throughout France 
with two-thirds ofthe municipalities electing 
communist or socialist mayors. Paris itself, 
despite the fact that its working class base
had been eroded by the pressure of hign rents 
and “development” projects, just failed to 
have a communist by 2,700 votes. Then there 
was May 24, the day o f the national strike. 
The demonstration in Paris was over 16 
kilometres long - the atmosphere was festive; 
the smell of victory was in the air for the first 
time since May ’68.
Victor^in the elections seemed certain and 
so the discussion centred on the possible 
scenarios after the elections. One scenario 
was that the implementation o f the Common
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Program would “ get the country out o f the 
crisis” and then provide the bridge towards 
the construction o f “socialism in the colors of 
France” . This was the official position o f the 
Communist Party and included the 
acceptance of the possibility that the right 
could possibly return to power in future 
elections.
A second, more utopian, scenario was that 
the victory of the left in the elections would 
mark a “ point o f no return”  where the 
Common Program would be just a starting 
point and that a socialist-com m unist 
government would have to rely increasingly 
upon a popular mass movement to combat 
the attacks and economic sabotage of 
national and international capitalist 
interests. The Common Program would be 
inadequate to satisfy the demands and rising 
hopes of the masses of people who voted for it 
and France would quickly fall into a 
revolutionary situation.
Then there was the “ eurocommunist” 
perspective. A rupture with capitalism in 
France would coincide with similar 
movements in Italy and, hopefully, Spain, 
Portugal and even possibly Belgium, leading 
to the establishment of a southern European 
bloc, differing radically in its democratic 
form from all previous communist societies.
Such a bloc would be economically, 
socially and politically viable, would alter all 
existing alliances in the third world and 
would set a model for workers in other 
capitalist countries where the political 
struggle was less developed.
One way or the other, the future, although 
uncertain, was full o f hope. One certainly 
had the feeling o f at least being on the 
winning side.
Shortly after the May national strike the 
situation started to look a little more 
complicated. The Common Program of the 
three left parties (the Communist Party, the 
Socialist Party and the Left Radicals) which 
had been signed in 1972, a period o f relative 
prosperity, had to be renegotiated to bring it 
up to date. In addition, the Communist Party 
was demanding that many of the vague 
proposals should be made more concrete “ for 
a good actualisation of the program, 
concretely defined, so that workers know 
exactly what they are fighting for and won’t 
be deceived after the elections” .
The heart o f the debate quickly centred on 
the following major issues:
* The nationalisations —
The socialists and particularly the left 
radicals opted for a conservative reading 
o f  t h e  C o m m o n  P r o g r a m .  
Nationalisations would be kept to a 
minimum with only the mother holding 
company nationalised and not the 
affiliates. The companies would be run 
by delegates appointed by the left 
government.
T he com m u n ists  cou n terp osed  
a d d it io n a l n a t io n a lis a t io n s  o f 
companies such as Citroen, and steel, 
due to the crisis now present in these 
industries. The nationalisations should 
be total and not “ just the brass plate on 
the door” , but all affiliated companies. 
The control of the companies would be a 
form of workers’ control.
* T he minimum w age
The basic wage in the 1972 common 
program was to be set at 1,000 francs 
($200) a month - a ridiculous figure in 
1977 with over 100 per cent inflation 
since then. The CPF proposed 2,400 
francs while the socialists proposed 
2,200 francs “ negotiable with the unions 
after the elections".
* The w age scale
The Communist Party proposed a 
maximum ratio o f salaries allowable in 
the country to be 5 to 1. The socialists 
and left radicals were against such a 
scheme, but would probably accept a 
ratio of 10 to 1.
* N ational defence
Major differences on defence policy, 
particularly as regards NATO. The 
situation was a little complicated also by 
a major about-face of the CP in going for 
a nuclear arms policy {a shock which is 
still reverberating in the ranks of the 
party).
The Communist Party attacked the 
socialists, the previous “champions of 
workers’ control” for their watered-down 
“ participation” scheme. The socialists 
retorted that the “ workers’ control” of the 
communists was only “union control” under 
the bureaucracy o f the CGT union.
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The negotiations dragged on with certain 
concessions being made on both sides. The 
question of the nationalisations, however, 
became more and more hotly debated with 
the two sides taking up intransigent 
positions.
Then Fabre, the leader o f the Left Radicals 
in a typical radical party ploy, slammed the 
door o f the negotiations, saying that the 
nationalisations of the communists were 
completely unacceptable.
Negotiations recommenced shortly after 
with the three parties very close to a 
com prom ise. The socialists proposed 
nationalising 270 o f the affiliates against the 
700-odd o f the communists. The other 
questions were considered to be either 
resolved or “negotiable” . The negotiations 
broke up at that point with neither side 
willing to concede another inch.
In the months that have followed the 
situation has gone from bad to worse. To the 
Communist Party, the Socialist Party has 
made a “ turn to the right" and wants to 
“manage the capitalist crisis”  andinstitutea 
plan of austerity after the style of the social 
democratic parties in Britain and Germany.
To the socialists, the Communist Party has 
returned to its old stalinist politics, doesn’t 
want to take power and can’t tolerate the 
notion of a strong socialist party.
A  fee lin g  o f  d esp a ir , g loom  and 
hopelessness swept in to replace the heady 
heights of the municipal elections and the 
great May national strike.
II
After the municipal elections of March ’77, 
with 70 per cent of the large cities in France 
electing socialist or communist mayors, one 
o f the left dailies ran a headline France is 
P in k !”  Capitalist France had voted 
massively for the Union of the Left with 
many cities that before had never even had a 
socialist mayor electing communists. In 
many towns and cities, people were dancing 
in the streets. It was even reported in one 
town that the village priest joined in with the 
crowd to sing the Internationale!
A study o f the voting figures showed two 
very important and interesting phenomena. 
The first was that the Union o f the Left had
worked as it had never done before. In the 
French two-round voting system, a 
candidate wins if he/Bhe gets over 50 per cent 
in the first round. If no one gets an absolute 
majority the vote is decided by a “ first past 
the post” system in a second round which 
follows one week later. The electoral alliance 
o f the Union o f the Left is an agreement by 
which the left candidate who gets the most 
votes in the first round stands alone against 
the right in the second round.
The problem in the past has been that 
although the well disciplined communist 
voters would vote for a socialist in the second 
round it was much more difficult to get 
socialists to vote communist. The important 
point of the municipal elections is that the 
socialists did vote communist in the second 
round. As l ’ Humanite, the CPF daily put it: 
“The elections marked the end o f anti­
communism in France” ,
The second point was the incredibly high 
vote for the environmentalists and the 
extreme left in the first round. In many o f the 
large cities they each received about 10 per 
cent of the vote. Practically all these votes 
then went to the Union o f the Left in the 
second round. The environmental movement 
was previously very weak in France. It’s 
startling electoral success marked its birth 
as a new and important political force in 
French politics - a point which didn’t escape 
the French bourgeoisie. A  few months later 
the ecologists organised the huge anti- 
nuclear demonstration at Malville where 
they had their first death as a result of a 
police offensive grenade - a deliberate 
attempt by the government to brand the 
environment movement as “ terrorist” , 
hoping to tarnish its wide electoral appeal.
The extreme left vote was a much more 
complex phenomenon, indicating a certain 
dissatisfaction o f traditional working class 
voters with the ambiguities of the Union of 
the Left (17 per cent o f one working class 
quarter in Orleans voted for the extreme left 
candidate) rather than a rapport with the 
philosophy of the extreme left coalition made 
up o f three of the largest extreme left parties.
Paradoxically, after receiving its greatest 
electoral support ever, the extreme left then 
went into a state of crisis with the daily 
R ouge almost going bankrupt for want of 
support and having to launch itself into a 
long process of self-criticism. Many people
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were leaving the extreme left parties and, in 
general, questioning the elitist attitudes of 
the movement and its leadership, its 
continual interventions “ from outside” , the 
idea of the “ professional Leninist-type 
revolutionary”  and the blind militancy 
demanded o f its members. In addition, the 
extreme left was finding it increasingly 
difficult to distinguish themselves from the 
Communist Party.
Semi-crisis in the extreme left was followed 
by a real crisis in the Union o f the Left. The 
starting point can be traced to the TV debate 
between Mitterand, the Socialist Party 
leader and Prime Minister Barre. Just before 
the debate, the Communist Party had 
released its version o f the Common Program 
complete with costs and figures, which went 
rather further than the socialist version. In 
front o f one o f the largest TV audiences in 
French history, Mitterand flatly stated that 
the program and figures were unacceptable 
to the Socialist Party. People watched 
dumbfounded as he then engaged in a 
friendly dialogue with his apparent 
colleague and supposed arch enemy, 
Raymond Barre.
From that day onwards the debate over the 
concrete development of the Common 
Program continued, the Socialist Party and 
Mitterand strategically being forced into, or 
willingly taking, a conservative position. 
The debate was carried out at the top level of 
the party hierarchies with absolutely no 
participation of rank and file members. It 
was a mass media event with the passive 
audience, the French people, watching 
hopelessly as the “ stars” , Mitterand, 
Marchais and Fabre, tore up the last 
remaining shreds o f the Union o f the Left.
It was now the turn of the traditional left to 
engage in a process of criticism and 
recrimination.
To the Communist Party, the socialists 
had taken a “turn to the right” but it was 
having considerable difficulty convincing its 
members of this. The debate over the 
“ actualisation of the common program" in 
1977 was not that much different from the 
heated debates that preceded the signing of 
the program five years earlier. Every 
communist knows that the socialists can’t be 
trusted but that is nothing new - they knew 
that when they signed the Common Program 
in 1972.
To many people, both inside and outside 
the party, the major disagreement seemed to 
be the nationalisation of 270 company 
affiliates as proposed by the Socialist Party 
against the 700 of the Communist Party. It 
seemed that the difference was hardly going 
to affect things one way or the other and was 
hardly worth threatening the prospects of 
the left in general and the aspirations of the 
millions of people who supported it.
Another point brought up in the debate 
that was now raging in full force in the press, 
the cafes and party cellules, was the political 
turn of the Communist Party. At the 22nd 
Congress two years ago, the party 
abandoned the notion - or at least the 
wording - of “ the dictatorship o f the 
proletariat” and in so doing also effectively 
accepted that the Communist Party was not 
the only legitimate party of the left. The 
present position of the CP is an apparent 
about-face with the party now claiming to be 
the on ly  party o f the left with the Socialist 
Party being hopelessly reformist and social 
democrat. Such a rapid and fundamental 
c h a n g e  h a s  c a u s e d  c o n s i d e r a b l e  
apprehension among traditional supporters 
of the party.
Another point o f concern to Communist 
Party supporters is the leadership’s attack 
on the Socialist Party as a homogeneous unit 
when, in fact, it is a coalition of many 
con flicting  tendencies including, for 
example, the CERES. The CERES is a sort of 
“socialist left” in the SP and represents 25 
per cent of the membership. On many issues 
it is to the left of the CP and, due to its 
considerable intellectual prowess, has 
played an important role in the theoretical 
evolution of the Communist Party on such 
matters as workers’ control, etc. By ignoring 
the diversity o f the Socialist Party, the CP 
l e a d e r s h i p  m a y  be u n w i t t i n g l y  
strengthening the hand of Mitterand at the 
expense of the more left forces in the party.
The debate and the political evolution 
continues and is not as destructive as it 
might first appear.
Ill
Paris has always been regarded as one of 
the most beautiful cities in the world with its 
wide avenues, its famous cafes and that
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bewildering array of whites and greys 
reflected from its majestic buildings. Its 
image in places like Australia is of “ gay 
Paree” , accompanied by Paris fashions, 
visions of the Eiffel tower, Notre Dame, and 
the Follies Bergere.
But behind this facade is another Paris - a 
Paris which is dying. It is being choked to 
death by a tight 40 kilometre circular 
“ freeway”  which spreads out in a wide band 
of misery for the people who live anywhere 
near it. Cutting through parks and 
previously tranquil residential areas, it is 
already saturated with a continuously 
snarling, rumbling, multi-lane traffic jam. 
The automobile has invaded Paris to such a 
degree that the benefits of owning a car are at 
best dubious. The environmental impact has 
been disastrous. The noise and pollution are 
often unbearable.
The automobile is only part o f the 
destruction o f Paris; a destruction that is 
proceeding at such a rate that one can see it 
taking place every day. I live near the Place 
des Fetes, an old, previously working class 
area, where rents were cheap and life, 
although hard, was relatively gay with over 
50 inexpensive bistros in a small radius.
Now it is all gone. The developers have 
moved in, razing it to the ground. The elderly 
who have spent all their lives in the quarter, 
have been forced out into the suburbs 
together with those workers who couldn’t 
afford the new rents. The Place des Fetes is 
now dominated by massive high rise 
apartment and office buildings.
Life for a French worker is becoming 
increasingly difficult in Paris, as elsewhere 
in France, with cramped living conditions, 
increasingly longer distances to travel to 
work, spiralling prices and the ever-present 
threat of unemployment. For the hundreds of 
thousands of foreign workers, the situation is 
even more intolerable.
It would be simplistic to say that the 
present wide discontent is just due to 
economic causes. It goes deeper than that. 
Many contributing factors have led to the 
developm ent o f  a deep-rooted social 
movement towards the left.
The uprising of May ’68 marked its 
beginning, even though it terminated in an 
electoral return for the right - albeit with
many social and economic gains to the 
French working class. In the wake o f the 
traumatic events of ’68 the concept of the 
Union o f the Left w;as conceived by the CP, 
gained acceptance by the newly-formed 
Socialist Party, with the Common Program 
being signed in 1972. The third party in the 
union, the Left Radicals, joined a few months 
later. The two big unions, the CGT and the 
CFDT, tacitly approved the program.
At that time the economic outlook was 
entirely different from that o f today. The 
prospect was still one o f continuing 
expansion despite some o f the looming 
economic problems. The task o f the Union of 
the Left was to break the stranglehold of the 
multinationals and monopolies on the 
economy, bring about a major improvement 
in social and economic conditions for the less 
favored and start the construction of 
socialism based on a new form o f democracy - 
the worker-controlled socialism o f the 
Socialist Party and the CFDT or the more 
paternalist idea of the Communist Party and 
the CGT at that time - that o f democratic 
management.
The theoretical doctrine of the Communist 
Party which justified their political position 
was based upon an economic analysis of 
“ State Monopoly Capitalism” . According to 
this “ SMC” theory, the chronic problem of 
periodic crises o f overproduction in a 
capitalist regime had been solved by 
monopoly capitalist interests using the state 
apparatus to overcom e the inherent 
contradictions o f the system. The crisis of 
overproduction of the capitalist system, 
according to Marx, leads to an economic 
depression where capital is destroyed or 
devalorised. After this process has reached a 
certain level, the conditions become 
favorable for the beginning of a new wave of 
expansion, going on to a boom and of course 
another crisis. According to the SMC theory 
of the Communist Party, the capitalist state, 
dictated to by monopoly interests, had 
deve l oped  means  o f  c o n t i n u a l l y  
devalorising capital by, for example, the 
state becoming a consumer (building up the 
public sector, armaments, etc.), offering 
cheap credit facilities to the monopolies, and 
so on. In each case the surplus capital arising 
from overproduction for the available 
market, can be continuously “ destroyed” or
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“ devalorised” . In so doing, the state 
continuously guarantees profits to the 
m onopolies and hence overcom es the 
periodic crises and depressions o f capitalism.
The political conclusion of this analysis is 
that the objective enemy is the monopolies 
and that one must organise the great mass of 
the French people against two or three per 
cent o f the population (the big bourgeoisie 
and the monopolies). The object was that the 
left was to take over the state apparatus and 
turn it from being a reflection o f monopoly 
capitalist interests to being a reflection of the 
interests o f the working class and its allies.
From 1972 to 1977, the economic situation 
had changed drastically. It is here that some 
left writers place the fundamental cause for 
the break-up o f the Union o f the Left, the 
changed economic scenario posing severe 
problems for the Communist Party at three 
levels.
At the practical level, the Communist 
Party feared the unknown consequences of 
being involved in a minority position in a 
Socialist-Communist government during a 
period of economic crisis.
This fear becomes clearer at the theoretical 
level due to the Communist Party’s lack o f 
any deep understanding o f the overall world 
capitalist crisis. Its state monopoly capitalist 
theory served more as a justification o f the 
previous political strategy than a theory 
which fitted with reality.
The third level is that of the conception of 
socialism. The Communist Party lacks a 
clear viable model of what it means by 
socialism. The old model of the Soviet Union, 
after the 1968 events in France and, more 
importantly, in Czechoslovakia, is no longer 
credible for the industrialised societies and 
practically  nobody really doubts the 
existence of the Gulag reality. These events 
and their influence, particularly on the new 
wave o f young communist militants, have 
necessitated an evolution in the conceptions 
o f the party. This evolution, although 
positive and necessary, has not been one 
towards greater clarity but has unleashed 
certain contradictions and confusions in the 
ranks o f the party. The model of socialism 
varies from the old Soviet model with the 
rider that it must be more democratic, to 
rather vague notions of what will happen 
after the implementation o f the defunct
Common Program. The necessity to change 
and adopt a more democratic image has 
come into conflict with the centralised 
structure of the party. The evolution has 
taken place, however, at the cellular level 
where discussion is the most open it has ever 
been. The party is hence more democratic 
than it has ever been, but the contradiction is 
that it is at the same time more centralised 
and dictatorial than ever to counteract the 
first tendency. The new party line is now 
obtained by w atching M archais on 
television. What then follows is a free and 
open discussion on the wisdom o f the party 
adopting the new line!
The theoretical and conceptual crisis in the 
French Communist Party becomes more 
clear when one notes that it refused to 
participate in the December Colloquium on 
Eurocommunism in Lugano, while Italian 
and Spanish parties sent top members from 
their central committees. To participate in 
such a debate, the French CP would have run 
the risk of contradicting many of their 
present official explanations in France.
If the economic crisis has plunged the left 
into disarray, it has also had its effect on 
framing the basic social reality against 
which all o f the political and electoral 
aspects must be seen in proper perspective.
Despite the break-up o f the Union o f the 
Left, the government has not progressed one 
pointIA recent poll has shown that the 
“ intention to vote” for the left would give PC - 
21 per cent, PSU - two per cent, PS and Left 
Radicals - 27 per cent, environmentalists - 
three per cent.... a total of 53 per cent against 
47 per cent for the right. This is almost 
exactly the same as in June ’77 just before the 
crisis in the left broke out! The relative 
rapport between the PC and the PS, if 
anything, shows a slight gain for the PC.
What then is taking place in France is the 
evolution o f a deep, broadly based movement 
towards the left that goes beyond even the 
political parties. If the break-up of the Union 
o f the Left has brought dism ay and 
disillusion to France, it certainly has not 
changed the underlying social reality.
Despite all the contradictions and 
confusion, it is the French Communist Party 
that has the monopoly on the slogan o f the 
hour .... “ the French people want change .... 
they want a real change” .
